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less concerned with knowledge for its 
own sake—and at times more rough-
hewn than their academic counter-
parts—were not always welcomed 
by pure academics, and vice versa.
Smith details how a powerful connec-
tion between the Navy’s ever-increasing 
knowledge of the maritime environment 
and seagoing commerce was forged 
and strengthened from the beginning. 
Time (and safety) was money to 
merchant captains and the owners for 
whom they worked. Matthew Fontaine 
Maury’s wind and current charts cut 
days or weeks from sailing times, and 
time saved was money earned. One 
of the book’s illustrations—a whaling 
chart produced by the Navy and used 
extensively by the captains of Herman 
Melville’s era—speaks to the cooperation 
between the commercial and military 
spheres. And whaling was not the only 
industry to have such close ties to the 
Navy; as underwater cables began to 
knit together continents and colonies, 
the requirement to map the topography 
of the deep ocean floor became 
more significant as the mechanisms 
to achieve this goal advanced.
As steam supplanted sail and Alfred 
Thayer Mahan’s strategic insights grew 
to dominate naval thinking, charts be-
came essential enablers of U.S. imperial 
ambitions. Using the Spanish-American 
War as a backdrop, Smith demonstrates 
how charts became tools of conquest. 
Spanish charts of Cuba, Puerto Rico, 
and the Philippines were incomplete, 
and without accurate hydrographic 
information American naval com-
manders’ difficulties increased. After 
victory in the Spanish-American War, 
accurate charts were vital in selecting 
the locations of future naval installations 
and coaling stations. The diligence 
of U.S. hydrographers in accurately 
charting these waters is nowhere more 
apparent than in a comparison of prewar 
charts of Guantánamo Bay with those 
created after the American victory.
To Master the Boundless Sea also 
acknowledges the Naval War College’s 
role in the development of naval 
hydrography and the evolution of the 
nautical chart into not only an aid 
to war but also a critical component 
of campaign and battle planning. Of 
particular note was the work of Captain 
William McCarty Little in bringing war 
gaming to Newport. Whereas Mahan 
articulated a strategic vision, McCarty 
Little’s wargaming charts mapped ways 
of making that vision a strategic reality.
Smith fills a major niche in understand-
ing the role of nautical charts, the people 
and organizations that created them, 
and how they all advanced scientific 
understanding and a larger American 
identity. To Master the Boundless Sea 
is a superb work that will reward the 
interested and discerning reader.
RICHARD J. NORTON
The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the 
Transformation of the Cold War, by Michael 
Cotey Morgan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. 
Press, 2018. 424 pages. $35.
One of the bigger questions in history—
right up there with why did the Roman 
Empire fall—is why did the Cold War 
end. This question becomes even more 
significant when one remembers that 
the United States and its allies defeated 
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact 
without a direct, military confrontation. 
Other long-term strategic confrontations 
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did not end so well. There are many ex-
amples, but three will suffice: Athens ver-
sus Sparta generated the Peloponnesian 
War, Rome versus Carthage produced the 
Punic Wars, and Britain versus Germany 
resulted in World Wars I and II. As a 
result, the issues that Michael Morgan 
explores in The Final Act are rather large.
While historians will continue wrestling 
with the issue of why the Cold War 
ended, it is a testimony to the intellectual 
power that Morgan brings to bear that 
this book, in all likelihood, will remain 
the book on the final act of the Helsinki 
Accords for decades to come. Why? Both 
the depth and breadth of the research 
are nothing less than astonishing. 
Morgan draws on material from fourteen 
archives in eight nations; this material, 
combined with published sources, is 
in nine different languages. There are 
103 pages of notes for 258 pages of text. 
The writing also is quite impressive, 
with sections reminiscent of Barbara W. 
Tuchman’s work; Morgan even invokes 
her book The Guns of August with a 
chapter entitled “The Pens of August.” 
With that point made, some sections read 
as if a PhD dissertation committee wrote 
and rewrote some paragraphs until all 
the flavor was removed—which actually 
might have been the case. Fortunately, 
these passages are not frequent.
What does Morgan do with these 
strengths? The short answer: he looks at 
the accords of the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe “in the 
round,” examining the perspectives of 
powers large and small. After a series of 
crises in the 1960s that raised questions 
about the legitimacy of the Soviet Union, 
Leonid I. Brezhnev pushed for the 
conference, desiring Western European 
recognition of the post-1945 borders 
in Eastern Europe—which also would 
constitute an acknowledgment of the 
validity of the Soviet system. The United 
States agreed to this gathering because 
it had suffered significantly in the 1960s 
from the trauma of Vietnam, which 
raised questions at home and abroad 
about the United States and its leader-
ship in world affairs. While the Soviets 
pushed for the conference, the smaller 
states of Europe were the ones most 
eager to take part. The gathering granted 
them a voice, and in Morgan’s narrative 
they often play key roles—for instance, 
in resolving diplomatic deadlocks.
Americans also were important, but 
more in support than in the lead. 
Presidents Richard M. Nixon and 
Gerald R. Ford both saw the gathering’s 
potential. Secretary of State Henry A. 
Kissinger, on the other hand, did not 
believe in this diplomatic effort, and 
the best thing that can be said about 
his role is that he did not get in the way 
of its progress. American diplomats 
were good, and often bested their 
Soviet counterparts, but mainly because 
Brezhnev wanted to reach an agreement 
quickly, so he often compromised on 
issues involving personal freedoms, 
conflict resolution, and sovereignty, in 
ways that ended up working against the 
long-term interests of the Communist 
system. As Morgan notes (turning some 
issues upside down), “Human rights 
provided a weapon for fighting the Cold 
War, not an escape from it” (p. 6).
The most intellectually impressive part of 
the book is the epilogue. Morgan looks at 
the legacy of Helsinki on bringing about 
the end of the Cold War. What gives this 
chapter power is that he uses the words 
of the defeated. Using source after source 
from the other side of the Iron Curtain, 
he shows how the final act changed 
Communist policies and behavior. 
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Wars and conflicts end only when the 
defeated accept their loss, and this section 
shows how new thinking developed 
in the capitals of the Warsaw Pact.
Even with all these points made, not 
everyone will accept Morgan’s arguments. 
The crisis of legitimacy in the 1960s 
certainly explains Soviet actions, but the 
decade was not identical for the United 
States. The constitutional legitimacy 
of the U.S. government and American 
leadership of its alliance were different 
and much, much, much stronger than 
those of the Soviets. Despite all the per-
suasive power of the epilogue, it comes 
up a bit short of convincing its readers, 
even if Morgan is right . . . probably.
In the end, though, most historians are 
lucky if they produce one book that 
endures; odds are that Morgan has done 
that. Expect to see this book in print 
for five or six decades—it is that good.
NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
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